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EUROPEAN BRIEF 166-75.4

I. USSR-EGYPT: THE USSR ISSUED I. STRONGEST ATTACK TO DATE ON EGYPTIAN POLICIES AND SINAI II ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES.

PRAVDA ON SATURDAY, IN AN ARTICLE SIGNED "OBSERVER," INDICATING TOP-LEVEL KREMLIN ENDORSEMENT, BITTERLY REBUTTED SADAT'S ALLEGATIONS OF LESS THAN WHOLEHEARTED SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT. THE ARTICLE SEEMED AIMED AT GETTING MOSCOW'S CASE ON THE RECORD AND DISCREDITING SADAT'S ARGUMENTS FOR DEALING WITH THE US."

PRAVDA WAS PARTICULARLY RESENTFUL ABOUT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC

CRITICISM OF SOVIET MILITARY AID, SAYING IT WAS "UTTER DISTORTION"

TO SUGGEST THAT ALL MOSCOW HAD SENT TO EGYPT DURING THE 1973 WAR

WERE "SEVERAL BAGFULS OF SPARE PARTS." IT ALSO DEMONSTRATED

CONTINUING SOVIET NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN

TREATY, SAYING THAT SADAT HIMSELF HAD CALLED FOR THE ACCORD.;

IN AN APPARENT ALLUSION TO SADAT'S PLANS TO DISCUSS US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT, MOSCOW REMINDED THE EGYPTIANS
THAT THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE WEST IN THE ZARLY 1950S DEMONSTRATES

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THAT "ONE WOULD HARDLY EXPECT IMPERIALIST STATES TO SHOW CONCERN FOR BUILDING EGYPT'S MILITARY STRENGTH."4

DESPITE ITS SCATHING TONE, THE ARTICLE DID NOT ATTACK SADAT
BY NAME AND KEPT THE DOOR OPEN FOR BETTER SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TIES.

PRAVDA, HOWEVER, CLEARLY PUT THE BURDEN ON EGYPT FOR INITIATING

SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT, SAYING THAT COOPERATION CANNOT DEVELOP IF ONE

PARTY FOLLOWS POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE IT.Y

IN THE CONTEXT OF ATTACKING SADAT'S RELIANCE ON WASHINGTON FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, THE ARTICLE ISSUED MOSCOW'S MOST AUTHORITATIVE EXPOSITION OF ITS OPPOSITION TO SINAI II. ALTHOUGH TOUGHLY WORDED, THE STATEMENT ESSENTIALLY EXPRESSED PUBLICLY WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SAYING PRIVATELY. IT PARTICULARLY CHASTISES THE PROVISION FOR US OBSERVERS IN THE SINAI, CALLING IT "FRAUGHT WITH FAR-REACHING, DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES."

ALTHOUGH PRAVDA REITERATED THE USEFULNESS OF THE GENEVA

CONFERENCE AS THE FORUM FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT, IT DID NOT

COMPLETELY REJECT FURTHER PARTIAL STEPS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT UNDER

THE GENEVA UMBRELLA. THE IMPRESSION CREATED IS THAT MOSCOW DOES NOT

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CLOSE OUT ANY PRACTICAL OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT STEP IN MIDDLE EAST
DIPLOMACY, AS LONG AS IT IS UNDERTAKEN WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION.

CONFIDENTIALLY

THE WEEKEND, AS CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM EXTREMISTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ENGAGED IN SUSTAINED BATTLES FOR CONTROL OF HERETOFORE NEUTRAL AREAS IN CENTRAL BEIRUT. PREVIOUSLY, THE TWO SIDES HAD STAYED GENERALLY WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE ENCLAVES, SHELLING NEARBY AREAS CONTROLLED BY THEIR OPPONENTS AND VENTURING OUT ONLY FOR HIT-AND-RUN BOMPING ATTACKS IN THE COMMERCIAL AREAS OF THE CITY.

THE US AND SOME OTHER FOREIGN EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN HIT IN THE WIDESPREAD FIRING. PREDICTABLY, THIS HAS PROMPTED SEVERAL EMBASSIES TO SPEED THE EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM LEBANON.

APPROXIMATELY HALF OF THE 7,000 AMERICANS NORMALLY RESIDENT IN BEIRUT HAVE ALREADY DEPARTED.Y

THE EXPANSION OF THE AREA OF HOSTILITIES HAS REDUCED FURTHER THE LIMITED AREA OVER WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL. PRIME MINISTER KARAMI ANNOUNCED THE EIGHTH IN THE MOST RECENT SERIES

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OF CEASE-FIRES AFTER AN EMERGENCY CABINET MEETING SUNDAY AFTERNOONS
HIS CALL WAS IMMEDIATELY AND WIDELY DISREGARDED.4

AT THE CABINET MEETING, KARAMI AND INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN REPORTEDLY ARGUED INCONCLUSIVELY ABOUT WHETHER TO ALLOW THE LEBANES ARMY TO PLAY A MORE FORCEFUL ROLE. SO FAR, THE ARMY HAS BEEN USED ONLY TO SECURE THE ROAD FROM THE CITY CENTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TO CONTROL SELECTED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS IN BEIRUT, AND IN A VERY LIMITED WAY TO REPLACE INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE UNITS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE CITY.

THE SPREAD OF FIGHTING OVER THE WEEKEND APPARENTLY REPRESENTED ONLY THE CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION FITHER THAN THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY ADDITIONAL GROUPS INTO THE

PARLIAMENT TRIED TWICE OVER THE WEEKEND TO CONVENE, BUT FAILED FOR LACK OF A QUORUM. MANY MEMBERS STAYED AWAY BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM, OTHERS PROBABLY TO FORESTALL A WIDELY ANTICIPATED PUBLIC SPLIT BETWEEN KARAMI AND SHAMUN.Y

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN INCHING TOWARD AN OPEN CHALLENGE DATE:

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TO SHAMUN AND PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH, AND ANY COMPREHENSIVE PARLIAMENTAR

DEBATE COULD END IN A VOTÉ OF CONFIDENCE IN KARAMI OR EVEN INTRO
DUCTION OF A MOTION DEMANDING FRANJIYAH'S RESIGNATION.Y

THE MAJORITY OF THE PARLIAMENT IS CHRISTIAN, BUT KARAMI MAY NOW BE PREPARED TO GAMBLE THAT HE WOULD WIN A CONFIDENCE VOTE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE MAY BELIEVE HE COULD FORCE A SHOWLOWN THAT WOULD, AT A MINIMUM, PROMPT MUSLIMS AND LEFTISTS, INCLUDING SOCIALIST LEADER KAMAL JUMBLATT, TO RALLY BEHIND HIM. HE MAY SEE THIS AS A WAY TO OBLIGE MODERATE CHRISTIANS INDIRECTLY TO CRITICIZE FRANJIYAH BY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT KARAMI IS PREFERABLE TO ANY LIKELY ALTERNATIVE. DESPITE HIS INABILITY TO END THE FIGHTING, KARAMI APPARENTLY RETAINS THE IMPORTANT BACKING OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE PALESTINIANS. HE HAS STEADILY GAINED STRENGTH AMONG LEBANESE AT FRANJIYAH'S EXPENSE. {SECRET}Y

3. PORTUGAL: THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH ITS AUTHORITY SOMEWHAT STRENGTHENED, DESPITE A SERIES OF TERRORIST BONBINGS AND A SPATE OF COUP RUMORS.4

ON HIS ARRIVAL SATURDAY IN PORTO, WHERE HE WENT TO SHORE UP THE

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REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER IN THE FACE OF LEFTIST ATTACKS, PRIME

MINISTER AZEVEDO SAID THAT AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE WOULD BE

REINSTATED IN PORTUGAL "AT ANY PRICE." ALTHOUGH AZEVEDO'S WORDS AT

THE PRO-GOVERNMENT RALLY WERE NOT AS UNCOMPROMISING, THE PRIME

MINISTER'S TRIP TO PORTO SIGNALED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN

COMMANDER'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE MILITARY DISCIPLINE. SUCH EFFORTS WERE

UNDERMINED EARLIER THIS MONTH BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAO WHEN HE

ACQUIESCED TO THE DEMANDS OF REBELLIOUS SOLDIERS.Y

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HIS VISIT TO PORTO WAS THE FIRST IN A SERIES TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH PRESUMABLY HE WILL USE TO MOBILIZE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS URGED THEIR SUPPORTERS NOT TO ATTEND AZEVEDO'S RALLY, HIS APPEARANCE IN PORTO DREW ABOUT 100,000 PEOPLE. THIS NUMBER CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION LAST WEEK IN LISBON, WHICH DREW ONLY ABOUT 13,000.4

IN A FURTHER POSITIVE MOVE, THE GOVERNMENT ON FRIDAY ANNOUNCED

NEW COMMANDERS FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL GUARD AND THE CIVIL POLICE.

THE MILITARY ALERT ANNOUNCED ON FRIDAY ENDED ABRUPTLY ON

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SATURDAY WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT THE COUNTRY IS NOW CALM: WHATEVER
THE REASON FOR THE ALERT, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SKILLFULLY USED BY
THE GOVERNMENT TO AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND
MARSHAL ITS FORCES. (SECRETLY

4. SPAIN: MOST SPANISH OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE GENERAL FRANCO
WILL RECOVER FROM HIS GRAVE ILLNESS AND HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION
ON THE POST-FRANCO PERIOD.Y

VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF WHAT HAS BEEN THE ILLEGAL OPPOSITION DURING
THE FRANCO ERA HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACT IN A
COOPERATIVE, RESPONSIBLE MANNER DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE
TRANSITION PERIOD. 4

--A LEADING OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED WORKERS'

COMMISSIONS SAID THAT THEY HAVE SPREAD THE WORD

TO THEIR MEMBERSHIP TO AVOID STRIKE ACTIVITY AND OTHER PROTEST ACTION

DURING THE TRANSITION.Y

--FELIPE GONZALEZ, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SPANISH SOCIALIST
WORKERS PARTY, REPORTEDED THAT HIS PARTY WILL GIVE
PRINCE JUAN CARLOS A CHANCE TO OPEN UP THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. A BASQUE
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SOCIALIST PARTY OFFICIAL ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS, AND GONZALEZ

BELIEVES THAT SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER CARRILLO ALSO SUPPORTS

THIS ATTITUDE, DESPITE THE CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS MADE BY COMMUNIS

PARTY OFFICIALS. 4

--AN INTIMATE OF TIERNO GALVAN, LEADER OF THE POPULAR
SOCIALIST PARTY AND A RIVAL OF GONZALEZ', CLAIMS THAT HIS PARTY WILL
NOT MAKE TROUBLE FOR JUAN CARLOS, AT LEAST INITIALLY.Y

THESE COMMENTS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT A MAJORITY OF POLITICAL GROUPS BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE OPPOSITION TACTICS AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY PREJUDICE THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND INVITE REPRESSION. THEIR FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION, HOUSVER, WILL DEPEND ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF JUAN CARLOS! PERFORMANCE. Y

THE FIRST CLUES AS TO JUAN CARLOS' INTENTIONS SHOULD APPEAR IN

THE NATIONWIDE SPEECH HE IS EXPECTED TO MAKE AFTER THE TRANSFER OF

POWER CEREMONIES. HE HOPES TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT, AND ITS

COMPOSITION WILL BE USED BY OPOSITION GROUPS TO MEASURE HOW FAR AND

HOW FAST JUAN CARLOS IS PREPARED TO PRESS FOR REFORM.Y

THE NEW HEAD OF STATE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SATISFY ALL SHADES

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OF POLITICAL OPINION. BUT HE HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF WINNING THE SUPPORT OF A COMMANDING MAJORITY IF HE DEVELOPS A POLICY THAT CLEARLY DEPARTS FROM THE TENETS OF FRANCO'S RULE WITHOUT APPEARING TO BE AN ABRUPT RUPTURE FROM THAT ERA. THUS, HE WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING A FREER POLITICAL SYSTEM. BUT ONLY GRADUALLY, AND WITH CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT THE EVOLUTION IS BEING TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITIES.

INEVITABLY, THERE WILL BE SOME TROUBLE REGARDLESS OF HOW

SKILLFULLY JUAN CARLOS MANAGES THIS PROCESS. FIFTEEN ALLEGED MEMBERS

OF THE FAR-LEFT TERRORIST ANTIFASCIST AND PATRIOTIC

REVOLUTIONARY FRONT WERE ARRESTED OVER THE WEEKEND; THIS GROUP

WILL CONTINUE, AND MAY INTENSIFY, ITS TERRORIST CAMPAIGN WHEN JUAN

CARLOS ASSUMES POWER.Y

VIOLENCE FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT MAY ALSO INCREASE. ON SUNDAY,

A RIGHT-WING GROUP CALLED THE DEATH COMMANDOS PUBLICLY ORDERED 17

PROMINENT CATALANS ASSOCIATED WITH LEFTIST POLITICAL GROUPS TO LEAVE

THE COUNTRY 24 HOURS AFTER FRANCO'S DEATH OR FACE DEATH THEMSELVES.Y

THE MILITARY, AND TO A GREATER EXTENT THE POLICE FORCES, ARE

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 166-75.4

GUYANA: HIGH-LEVEL MINISTERIAL TRAVEL TO HAVARA MARKS ANOTHER PHASE IN GUYANA'S GROWING TIES WITH THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.Y

IN RECENT MONTHS, THREE CABINET MINISTERS—HAMILTON GREEN, COOPERATIVES AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION; STEVE NARAINE, WORKS AND HOUSING; AND SHIRLEY FIELD—RIDLEY, INFORMATION AND CULTURE—AHAVE MADE VISITS TO CUBA TO PROFIT FROM THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE IN THEIR PARTICULAR FIELDS. IN ADDITION, UNIVERSITY OF GUYANA VICE CHANCELLOR DENNIS IRVINE LED A SEVEN—MAN DELEGATION FROM THE MINISTRIES OF EDUCATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EARLIER THIS MONTH TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADAPTING CUBAN WORK—STUDY PROGRAMS TO GUYANA. THE GUYANESE DELEGATION WAS EXPECTED TO INVITE CUBAN REPRESENTATIVES TO COME TO GUYANA TO ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT HOW SUCH PROGRAMS COULD BE INSTITUTED.Y

CUBA IS ALREADY THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATION WITH WHICH
GUYAHA'S TOP LEADERS AS WELL AS SOME OF ITS CHIEF TECHNOCRATS ARE
MOST IDEOLOGICALLY ATTUMED. IN RECENT MONTHS BURNHAM AND TOP PRRTY
AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE SINGLED OUT CUBA AS A SOCIALIST MODEL

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FOR GUYANA. THESE INCIPIENT LINKS SEEN LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN AS BURNHAM ATRIVES TO TRANSFORM GUYANA INTO A SOCIALIST ONE-PARTY STATE-Y

A SPEARHEAD OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP VERY LIKELY WILL BE THE CUBAN EMBASSY NOW BEING SET UP IN GEORGETOWNE A RESIDENT CUBAN FISHING MISSION HAS BEEN IN GEORGETOWN SINCE EARLY 1974. THE 32-YEAR-OLD CUBAN AMBASSADOR, IVAN CEASAR MARTINEZ MONTALVO, IS EXPECTED TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS LATER THIS YEAR. THE GUYANESE ARE AWAITING HIS ARRIVAL BEFORE ESTABLISHING AN EMBASSY IN HAVANA. THEIR AMBASSADOR TO CUBA WILL REPORTEDLY BE FRANK CAMPBELL, THE 29-YEAR-OLD EDITOR OF THE NEW NATION. THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE RULING PEOPLE'S NATIONAL CONGRESS. (CONFIDENTIAL) E-2 IMPLET.

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FAST ASIA BRIEF 166-75.4 '

VIETNAM: THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE AGREED TO REPATRIATE

SOME 1-100 REFUGEES WHO SET SAIL FROM GUAM NEARLY TWO WEEKS AGO.4

HANDI ANNOUNCED OVER THE WEEKEND THAT THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WHILE DEPLORING WASHINGTON'S DECISION TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO DEPART GUAM WITHOUT SAIGON'S PERMISSION AS A "BLATANTLY PROVOCATIVE" VIOLATION OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY, HAD NEVERTHELESS DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE REFUGEES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS—"THIS TIME ONLY." THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL FUTURE REQUESTS FOR REPATRIATION WILL BE DECIDED BY THE SAIGON REGIME ALONE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.Y

THUS FAR, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ACTUALLY PERMITTED ANY OF THE REFUGEES TO DISEMBARK. THE ULTIMATE POINT OF DEBARCATION IS ALSO UNCLEAR. [CONFIDENTIAL] E-2 IMPDET.d

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 166-75.4

SPANISH SAHARA: SPAIN AND MOROCCO ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY CAN AGREE ON A SETTLEMENT OF THE SPANISH SAHARA. MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI WAS IN MADRID FOR TALKS LATE LAST WEEK, AND A HIGH SPANISH OFFICIAL SAID THAT WHEN THE MOROCCAN NEGOTIATORS RETURNED TO MADRID SOON, POSSIBLY THIS WEEK, PROGRESS WOULD BE EVIDENT.

A DISPUTE IN THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER

ARIAS' POLICY TO CEDE THE SAHARA TO MOROCCO IN RETURN FOR GUARANTEES

REGARDING SPANISH INTERESTS IN THE TERRITORY AND FOREIGN MINISTER

CORTINA'S INSISTENCE ON GRANTING SELF-DETERMINATION WAS SETTLED

BY DISCARDING CORTINA'S POLICY, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL. THE

SOURCE CLAIMED THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE PRESENT PROBLEM TO

BE BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO AND NOT BETWEEN SPAIN AND ALGERIA.

PREVIOUSLY, SPAIN HAD INSISTED ON ALGERIAN AGREEMENT TO AVOID

A MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN CLASH WHEN SPAIN WITHDREW. THE SPANIARDS ARE

BEING VERY TIGHT-LIPPED ABOUT THE ACTUAL TERMS OF THE PROPOSED

SETTLEMENT. IF ALGERIA HAS A PROBLEM WITH MOROCCO, THAT IS A

SEPARATE MATTER.Y

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THE SPANIARDS WANT TO SETTLE THE SAHARA PROBLEM QUICKLY. BEFORE THE MOROCCAN MARCH TO THE SAHARA PROCEEDS MUCH FURTHER. THE SPANISH OFFICIAL SAID UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD. SPAIN LET THE MARCHERS ENTER SAHARAN TERRITORY. SPAIN MAY ALSO WANT TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE POST-FRANCO ERA GETS UNDER WAY. TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT, A BILL HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE CORTES WHICH WOULD EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY ACTION NECESSARY TO 25X1X DECOLONIZE THE SAHARA.Y

SPAIN APPARENTLY WANTS THE UN'S BLESSING.

ALSO STATED THAT SPAIN STOOD BY ITS POLICY, COMMUNICATED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL LAST MAY, TO DECOLONIZE UNDER UN AUSPICES. SUCH DECOLONIZATION, HOWEVER, COULD IN THE SPANISH VIEW INCLUDE HANDING THE TERRITORY OVER DIRECTLY TO THE MOROCCANS.Y

MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI AT HIS DEPARTURE OCTOBER 25 COMMENTED THAT HE WAS "VERY SATISFIED" WITH THE CONVERSATIONS IN MADRID. HE SAID THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED WAYS OF SETTLING THE DISPUTE PEACEFULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 22, AND THAT SPAIN AND MOROCCO WERE "ON

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FOR TALKS WITH THE KING. BOTH COUNTRIES CLAIM THE SPANISH SAHARA AND APPARENTLY HAVE AN AGREEMENT TO PARTITION THE TERRITORY. "

MEANUHILE, DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS ARE CONTINUING IN AN EFFORT TO AVERT A CRISIS OVER MOROCCO'S MASS MARCH TO THE SPANISH SAHARA. KING HASSAN, IN AN INTERVIEW BROADCAST MONDAY, REPEATED HIS INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH THE MARCH, ALTHOUGH RABAT IS DELAYING THE FINAL LEG FROM THE BORDER TO EL AAIUN, THE SPANISH TERRITORY'S CAPITAL. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM MARRAKECH, KING HASSAN NOW PLANS TO LEAD THE MARCH INTO SPANISH SAHARA IN ABOUT TWO MEEKS.Y

UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM, BY A RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HIM TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES INVOLVED, SPOKE WITH KING HASSAN OCTOBER 26 AND WENT ON TO MAURITANIA THE SAME DAY. HE WAS IN ALGIERS MONDAY AND ARRIVED IN MADRID MONDAY NIGHT. TUNISIAN AND FRENCH DIPLOMATS WERE ALSO IN MOROCCO OVER THE WEEKEND TO

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URGE HASSAN TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT.Y

IN THE SPANISH SAHARA, EVACUATION OF SPANISH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DEPENDENTS IS SAID TO BE UNDER WAY. THE POLISARIO FRONT, A SAHARAN POLITICAL GROUP SUPPORTED BY ALGERIA, HELD A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN EL AAIUN OCTOBER 26 IN SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TERRITORY.

ALGERIA IS INCREASING ITS PRESS ATTACKS AGAINST MOROCCO, TO

COUNTER KING HASSAN'S CLAIM TO SPANISH SAHARA AND RESPOND TO

VIRULENT ANTI-ALGERIAN ATTACKS BEING PRINTED BY OPPOSITION POLITICAL

PARTIES IN MOROCCO. THE ALGERIANS ARE GIVING HEAVY PLAY TO ADVERSE

WORLD PRESS REACTION TO MOROCCO'S PLANNED MARCH. THEY ARE OPENLY

QUESTIONING HOW BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RABAT AND MADRID CAN

BE RECONCILED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION LAST WEEK THAT

CALLED FOR A DIALOGUE AMONG ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, A FORMULATION

THAT WOULD ALLOW ALGERIAN PARTICIPATION IN ANY TALKS. THE ALGERIAN

PRESS ALSO HAS POINTEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT MOROCCO'S HISTORICALLY

"NON-EXISTENT" TERRITORIAL CLAIM TO SPANISH SAHARA WAS RECENTLY

QUESTIONED IN AN ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

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